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                                                Abstract* 
 
Steven Kates has recently (2015a) attempted to explain and justify J S Mill’s 
paradoxical “fourth proposition on capital”, which states that “demand for 
commodities is not demand for labour”, a proposition which notoriously – over 
generations – has baffled many eminent commentators. Kates intends to resolve 
the puzzle by offering “a proper understanding of Say’s Law as it was 
understood by Mill and his contemporaries.” We conclude that Kates does 
indeed reveal the logic of Mill’s proposition, making it clear that from Mill’s 
lost “supply-side” perspective, it is in no way puzzling or paradoxical. However, 
at the same time it becomes evident that Mill’s whole position is undermined by 
his acceptance of the untenable belief that “demand is constituted by supply”, 
which leaves us with the clear understanding that his fourth proposition, despite 
Kates’s rationalisation and defence thereof, as well as certainly being 
paradoxical,  is simply untrue. 
 
        This paper is an expanded version of a short note entitled 
          “Kates on Mill’s Fourth Proposition on Capital: Why All the Fuss?” 
    which is forthcoming in The History of Economics Society’s 
               Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 
                 I wish to express my thanks to the Society 
             and to the Editor of the JHET, Steve Meardon, 
       for allowing publication of this piece as a Strathclyde Discussion Paper. 
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                                              “Drop the Dead Donkey” 
                            A Response to Steven Kates on the Subject of 
                                   Mill’s Fourth Proposition on Capital 
                               
Introduction 
 
Steven Kates is well-known as a present-day proponent of the old “classical” macroeconomics 
of Jean Baptiste Say, James Mill, David Ricardo and J S Mill. He regards that body of thought 
as being of superior merit to, and of much greater practical relevance than the Keynesian 
theory which subsequently supplanted it as the mainstream wisdom.
1
 He holds by Say’s Law, 
“which seems simplicity itself, [was] accepted by every economist for more than a hundred 
years up until 1936, [but] is apparently an impassable obstacle in the modern world.”2 Mill 
sees Say’s Law as creating an unfortunate intellectual barrier which cuts modern readers off 
from valuable theoretical contributions of the past. Kates, as he himself says, has “written 
books and papers, monographs and articles”3 in a long-sustained effort to persuade the 
economics profession to see its way around that “obstacle”. Most recently he has focused 
attention on Mill’s puzzling “fourth fundamental proposition on capital”, which notoriously 
states that “demand for commodities is not demand for labour”. In fact, Kates evidently means 
(Kates, 2015a) to settle, once and for all, the status of that contentious proposition by 
providing an explanation and defence of the apparent paradox presented by Mill. His intention 
(2015a, p.55) is to demonstrate that: 
 
Mill’s fourth proposition is no paradox. It is not a riddle. It is an answer to those 
who believe that an increase in unproductive spending can increase the number of 
persons employed. Mill denied it is possible and was doing no more than 
expressing the near-unanimous conclusion of the economists of his time at the end 
of the general glut debate. It was a conclusion embedded within economic theory 
until the publication of The General Theory in 1936 representing, as it did, the 
actual meaning of Say’s Law within classical economic thought.  
 
Kates’s explanation and defence of Mill’s fourth proposition 
 
To convince readers of the logic and validity of Mill’s fourth proposition Kates adopts two 
lines of approach. One is to argue that the difficulty scholars today have with the proposition 
stems not from any error in Mill’s analysis, but from the fact that in the years since Mill 
formulated the proposition, the mind-set of economists has so altered that what was familiar 
                                                          
1
 “We seem to have a completely false notion that economic theory moves only forward, that the latest is the 
best, and that the past has been transcended. The reality is that the economics of Mill, even his 1848 first edition, 
will provide more insight into the operation of an economy than any of the Samuelson clones that have been 
published to explain what Keynes meant in trying to raise aggregate demand.” (Kates, 2015b, p.12) 
2
  Kates (2014, p.9). 
3
 Kates (2014, p.9). See, for instance, Kates (1998), Say’s Law and the Keynesian Revolution: How 
Macroeconomic Theory Lost Its Way, and Kates (2003), Two Hundred Years of Say’s Law, etc. 
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and readily understood in Mill’s day has (unfortunately) become virtually unintelligible to the 
modern reader. Kates names a number of subsequent, and eminent, commentators as having 
found great difficulty in grasping Mill’s meaning. In this connection, Marshall, Allyn Young, 
Hayek and Samuel Hollander are mentioned. For this state of general incomprehension, Kates 
blames both the marginal and the Keynesian revolutions for shifting theoretical attention away 
from the old emphasis on supply-side factors in determining levels of output and employment 
to a completely different focus on conditions of demand, thereby effecting a fundamental 
change of theoretical perspective, and so making it difficult or impossible for later readers to 
follow Mill’s argument.4 
 
To make the point that to Mill’s contemporaries his analysis was in fact intelligible and 
generally deemed correct, Kates, when referring to the fourth proposition, never fails to cite 
Sir Leslie Stephen’s dictum (1876, p.297) that “complete apprehension” of Mill’s fourth 
proposition “is, perhaps, the best test of a sound economist”. (Kates, 2015a, p.40)  But should 
we take Leslie Stephen as an authority on economic theory? Note that Joseph Schumpeter 
(1950, p.116) regarded Stephen not as an economist, but as “first and last, a political 
sociologist”. Again Kates likes to mention that, after the publication in 1848 of Mill’s 
Principles, which included the contentious fourth proposition, the volume and the proposition 
were readily accepted by the profession.  The fact that by 1848 the principal critics of the 
Say’s Law doctrine – Malthus, Chalmers and de Sismondi – had all passed from the scene 
may be not unconnected with the smooth passage which Mill’s Principles received.  
 
Kates’s main line of defence of the fourth proposition is an attempt, by focusing on the four 
propositions on capital together with Mill’s understanding of Say’s Law, to spell out Mill’s 
own reasoning in the hope that readers, having been forewarned that Mill’s theoretical 
perspective was not that of a present-day Keynesian, will appreciate Mill’s logic and find his 
meaning self-evident. As Kates puts it (2015a, p.45): 
 
This paper will . . . attempt to explain Mill’s reasoning in a way that not only 
demonstrates the internal coherence of his statement, but will also argue that the 
fourth proposition and the first three together provide a logical and cohesive 
understanding of the operation of an exchange economy, based as they are on an 
understanding of the classical meaning of Say’s Law.5 
 
Let us consider Kates’s explanation. 
 
                                                          
4
  Kates (2003, p.75) referring to the proposition that “demand is constituted by supply” comments, “So inbred 
have Keynesian ways of thinking become that this conception may simply be beyond the comprehension of a  
modern economist.” (It might of course, pace Kates, simply be wrong.) 
5
 Kates adds to the above the following; “Moreover, the demonstration that demand for commodities is not 
demand for labor requires no retreat into classical presuppositions such as the wages-fund to explain why this 
may be the case, or any reading into the text of some principle left unstated on the pages of Mill’s Principles.” 
With that we cannot agree: it appears that Mill certainly does employ the notion of a “wage-fund”. Note that all 
editions of the Principles, as edited by Mill, were published before his celebrated “recantation” of the wage-fund 
doctrine. See discussion below and footnote 5. 
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First recall Kates’s complaint that an intellectual “discontinuity” has cut modern economics 
off from the conventional mode of thinking of Mill’s time. Kates believes that to understand 
Mill and his apparently paradoxical fourth proposition we must bridge this conceptual gap by 
recovering, in his own terms, Mill’s interpretation of how the economy works. What must be 
then be understood is that Mill’s whole approach was based on the supposition (a supposition 
shared today by Kates) that what happens on the supply side is crucial in determining the state 
and progress of the economy. Kates holds that the loss of this essential insight - swamped by 
the impact of the marginalist and Keynesian revolutions – has led macroeconomics into a 
disastrously wrong turning by directing attention away from supply to the state of demand for 
output as the primary determining factor.  
 
From Mill’s (traditional) perspective, in all situations it is supply-side factors that are of 
primary importance. Initially, for goods to be produced, labour must be supported by capital – 
capital which must be supplied (from savings) before it can put labour into motion. The 
supply of capital is vital: without capital, no employment, no production. Production in each 
sector – i.e. supply - mutually creates the purchasing power to buy the productions of all other 
sectors. Supply is demand. Overall supply cannot outrun demand as supply and demand are in 
reality opposite sides of the same coin. This (Say’s Law) understanding does not exclude the 
possibility of recession and unemployment – unemployment occurring as the result of 
miscalculation of the appropriate supply in relation to demand – certainly not in consequence 
of a deficiency of the “desire to purchase” relative to capacity to produce. 
 
It is Kates’s intention to assure modern readers that, from Mill’s perspective (and his own) 
there is nothing puzzling or paradoxical in Mill’s fourth proposition. 
 
We note first what Kates says about Say’s Law, and then continue with the four propositions 
on capital. As regards Say’s Law as understood by Mill, Kates emphasises the belief that 
demand is constituted by supply, that demand deficiency was not seen as a legitimate 
explanation for recessions, but that it was accepted (something not usually understood today) 
that “recessions do occur”, these being caused “by errors in production decisions”, not by 
deficiency of demand. Kates stresses (2015a, p.45) that Mill “meant his fourth proposition to 
apply to situations where large-scale unemployment exists. His point was that even with high 
unemployment, an increase in demand would not lead to an increase in the number of jobs.” 
  
Kates duly notes the substance of the four propositions. Thus,  proposition one: “industry  is 
limited by capital” (capital being defined as all means of subsistence, materials and equipment 
necessary to support labour engaged in production); proposition two:  “capital . . . is the result 
of saving”; proposition three: “capital . . . although saved, and the result of saving is 
nevertheless consumed” (used up in supporting productive labour in adding to the stock of 
resources); and proposition four (Mill, 1866, I, v, 9), “what supports and employs productive 
labour, is the capital expended in setting it to work, and not the demand of purchasers for the 
product of the labour when completed. Demand for commodities is not demand for labour.” 
With proposition four comes the corollary: “The demand  for commodities determines in what 
particular branch of production the labour and capital shall be employed; it determines the 
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direction of the labour; but not the more or less of the labour itself, or of the maintenance or 
payment of the labour. These depend on the amount of the capital, or other funds directly 
devoted to the sustenance and remuneration of labour.” 
 
That, effectively, is all that Kates has to say in support of Mill’s fourth proposition.  What do 
we make of this “explanation”? The focus is clearly on the supply side. The first three 
propositions, and indeed the first part of proposition four, are uncontentious and perfectly 
acceptable – they state that capital is accumulated via saving out of current income, and that 
for labour to be employed, the application of capital is required, as the means, in Adam 
Smith’s phrase, of “putting labour into motion”. But, from a modern perspective, it may still 
be difficult to understand the latter part of proposition four – why do Mill and Kates insist that 
demand for commodities is not demand for labour?  
 
We need to return to Kates’s statement (quoted above) that “the fourth proposition and the 
first three together provide a logical and cohesive understanding of the working of an 
exchange economy” to see if it holds the clue to the position he is taking.  We think it does. 
We suggest that Kates is arguing that if (as he believes) supply really does create demand, the 
fourth proposition simply recognises this in stating that the supply of productive resources is 
what determines the volume of both employment and demand. In other words, it would be a 
contradiction of Say’s Law to suppose that “demand for commodities is demand for labour”; 
the fourth proposition is implicit in the other three when Say’s Law is taken as valid. From 
Mill’s perspective, supply-side conditions determine the amount of expenditure on the 
employment of labour. Resources are offered in the sure confidence of there being no problem 
with the volume of demand necessary to take up the resulting output: the sole role thus left to 
demand for output is merely to determine the allocation of that given amount of employment 
amongst the various branches of production. 
 
Employment depends on the quantity of resources available to support labour; the availability 
of resources does not simply set a maximum limit to the possible volume of employment – 
resources will be used to the full in supporting labour.  Mill is explicit: 
 
While on the one hand, industry is limited by capital, so on the other, every 
increase in capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to 
industry; and this without assignable limit. I do not mean to deny that the capital, 
or part of it, may be so employed as not to support labourers, being fixed in 
machinery, buildings, improvement of land, and the like. . . . What I do intend to 
assert is, that the portion which is destined to their maintenance, may (supposing 
no alteration in anything else) be indefinitely increased, without creating an 
impossibility of finding them employment; in other words, that if there are 
human beings capable of work, and food to feed them, they may always be 
employed in producing something.                                           (Mill, 1866, I, v, 1)                                                         
 
That is, we believe, what Kates intends us to understand as his explanation of the “paradox”: 
that availability of capital, not demand for output, is the key factor in determining the volume 
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of employment. That such is his line of thought is made more clearly explicit in an earlier 
account he has given of the fourth proposition. He says there (Kates, 2011, p.79): 
 
Mill’s fourth proposition states that “demand for commodities is not demand for 
labour”. Its meaning: when you buy goods and services you are not hiring 
labour. This is how it was put by Mill: “To purchase produce is not to employ 
labour; . . .  the demand for labour is constituted by the wages which precede the 
production, and not by the demand which may exist for the commodities 
resulting from the production.” 
 
What this means is this. When someone buys goods, they are not themselves 
employing the labour or paying the wages. By the time the good is bought, the 
work has already been done, and workers have already been paid. The 
employment of labour is an entrepreneurial decision made in advance of 
production and sale. It is not the consequence of someone finally having bought 
the product. 
 
The question we must now ask is – what underlies this interpretation of events? Obviously, a 
basic factor is the Say’s Law presumption that overall demand naturally accommodates itself 
to whatever volume of output is offered on the market – no need to worry about the volume of 
demand relative to the volume of potential output.  The other understanding on which Mill’s 
position depends, is evidently (despite Kates’s denial of the point6) the wage-fund theory of 
employment (a derivative of Say’s Law) which holds that at any time there is, available in the 
hands of employers, a fixed volume of capital which will be applied to “put labour into 
motion”. The volume of employment at any time depends therefore, given the value of real 
wages, on the size of the existing “wage-fund” of investible resources. Demand for output has 
nothing to do with determining the size of the fund: demand for output passively adapts itself 
the size of that fund. 
 
George Stigler (1988, p.3) recognised what Mill had in mind: 
   
Consider the famous fourth proposition on capital . . . : a demand for 
commodities is not a demand for labor; rather, the demand influences only the 
allocation of labor among industries. This argument is most clearly stated in the 
first edition, where its essence is simply this: labor is employed by the existing 
wages fund, - all labour if wages are flexible, a suitably limited amount of labour 
if  wages are not flexible.   Then the composition of  the  demand  for  output  by  
consumers influences only where the employed labourers will be occupied. 
Q.E.D.    
 
                                                          
6
 See footnote 4 above. Kates’s denial of the use of the wage-fund theory in Mill’s analysis appears to depend on 
a misreading by Kates (2015a, p.48) of Mill’s meaning. Mill does distinguish between all real capital goods and 
the wage-goods required to maintain labour. 
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We are thus given to understand that, within the terms of Mill’s conception, it can be said that 
“demand for commodities is not demand for labour”: Mill’s proposition follows with perfect 
logic from his basic Say’s Law understanding of how the economy works.  
 
But without a “tame” aggregate demand function – that is to say, outwith a world of Say’s 
Law - Mill’s fourth proposition makes no sense.  In the real world of uncertainty, resources 
are invested to support labour in employment, not simply on the basis of their availability, but 
on the basis of expectations – forecasts – as to the conditions in the market for the output 
which that labour will produce. If prospects appear unpropitious, funds may be retained in 
liquid form rather than committed to specific (and illiquid) real assets. Both the volume and 
the direction of planned production do depend on expectations of demand.  
 
Thus Mill’s fourth proposition, while from Mill’s own (obsolete) perspective straightforward 
and in no way paradoxical, is, from a modern “demand-orientated” viewpoint, certainly 
paradoxical and essentially invalid: it involves the untenable assumption that an entrepreneur 
will – under all normal circumstances7 - commit to employment and production all the 
resources at his command, without any doubts as to the adequacy of a market for the resulting 
output.  But it cannot reasonably be assumed that any volume of production must find a 
market. We may correctly say that, in reality, demand for commodities is demand for labour. 
 
Examples of Mill’s analysis on the basis of the proposition that “demand for 
commodities is not demand for labour” 
 
Once we thus appreciate the foundations of Mill’s position in Say’s Law and the wage-fund 
theory of employment, it becomes easy to understand his reasoning in the several, otherwise 
puzzling, examples he offers as illustrative of his fourth proposition on capital. Let us 
therefore conclude this discussion by reviewing Mill’s applications of his fourth proposition. 
We can see how the proposition, woven deeply into Mill’s thinking, supports conclusions 
which a modern theorist would not countenance. 
 
Initially he puts two cases before the reader: firstly, one in which demand for a commodity 
exists, but the necessary capital does not; the second instance is of the opposite situation in 
which capital is available but demand for output is absent. 
 
Case 1 is described thus:  
 
Suppose, for instance, that there is a demand for velvet: a fund ready to be laid 
out in buying velvet, but no capital to establish the manufacture. It is of no 
consequence how great the demand may be: unless capital is attracted into the 
                                                          
7
 Mill allows (only) that in the case of a financial crisis, and breakdown of the normal mechanisms of exchange 
and credit, traders my well try keep money in hand and desist from commercial ventures. For an extended 
discussion of the foundations of Mill’s belief in Say’s Law , see Grieve, R H (forthcoming, 2016, Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought), “Keynes, Mill and Say’s Law: the legitimate case Keynes ought to have made 
against J S Mill.” 
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occupation, there will be no velvet made, and consequently none bought; unless, 
indeed, the desire of the intending purchaser for it is so strong, that he employs 
part of the price he would have paid for it, in making advances to workpeople 
that they may employ themselves in making velvet; that is, unless he converts 
part of his income into capital, and invests that capital in the manufacture.   
                                                                                                   (Mill, 1866, I, v, 9) 
 
To the modern reader, this is weird: one cannot see why there should be any problem – 
nothing more than the temporary difficulty of a shortage of velvet until the unsatisfied 
demand attracts resources into velvet production. Why does Mill not simply take it that 
resources will be transferred from somewhere else in the economy or created as required? 
Why should the consumer himself have to undertake production? But in the light of our 
investigation of Mill’s thinking, all becomes clear. Capital – a free supply of capital, a larger 
wage-fund – has to be in existence before velvet can be produced: the mere emergence of a 
demand for velvet does not in itself, ceteris paribus, generate an increase in the available 
wage-fund. Unless the anxious customer himself adds to the wage fund by putting up the 
capital to employ extra workers in velvet production, no such production is possible. Mill has 
no conception of the demand for labour being derived from the demand for what labour 
produces: the demand for labour is simply constituted by the resources available to “put 
labour into motion”. 
 
Case 2 illustrates again – from the opposite perspective – Mill’s adherence to Say’s Law. In 
this instance, if there is capital available to support labour in employment, that labour will 
certainly be employed: the is no need to worry about the sufficiency of demand to take up the 
output that labour will employ. Thus Mill: “the employment afforded to labour does not 
depend on the purchasers, but on the capital” That is to say, as cited above: “in other words, 
that if there are human beings capable of work, and food to feed them, they may always be 
employed in producing something.” (1866, I, v, 3) Somehow or other, if capital is on offer, 
employment will be generated – end of story. 
 
In his chapter “Fundamental Propositions on Capital” (1866, I, iv) Mill hammers away at the 
fourth proposition point that it is not the purchase of commodities that creates employment: 
more labour can be brought into employment only via increasing the wage fund – which may 
be done through advancing capital for the direct employment of workers, not through buying 
finished products. Given his acceptance of the wage-fund theory Mill tries to show – via a 
series of elaborate examples - that it is only through the direct employment of labour that an 
increase in employment can be generated. 
 
The background here is that Mill is firmly opposed to Malthus’s policy recommendation that, 
in times of recession, the wealthy should spend more - create more demand for luxuries – in 
order to boost the demand for labour. But if, according to Mill, “demand for commodities is 
not demand for labour”, it is evident that “the demand for labour cannot be increased by 
increasing the demand for goods.” Mill contends not only that additional luxury spending 
cannot generate more employment, but can, on the contrary, actually reduce the wage-fund. 
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Consequently, if, when there is unemployment, a wealthy individual wishes to help “the 
labouring class”, he may do so by charitable giving, or offering direct employment, but there 
is simply no point in his increasing spending on luxury items for his own use.
8
  
 
Mill attempts to demonstrate, via a number of examples, that if a landowner changes his 
pattern of luxury expenditures - increasing his spending on direct labour (say, on the services 
of workers to enhance the beauty of his estate) instead of buying manufactured luxuries, he 
thereby increases the wage-fund and increases simultaneously the demand for labour. 
(Correspondingly, increasing purchases of luxuries at the expense of employing labour 
directly, will, Mill holds, diminish employment.) 
 
If we examine at least one of his illustrations, the error (from a modern perspective) of Mill’s 
thought becomes evident: he forces a questionable answer out of his example in order to make 
the point that increasing the demand for manufactured commodities is not the way to benefit 
labour. Consider the following illustration. Mill supposes that a landowner who has been 
accustomed to spend on a luxury item (velvet) gives up that expenditure and instead employs 
labour directly on beautifying his estate. The modern reader will understand that, in so doing, 
Mill’s landowner is simply exchanging one form of luxury expenditure for another, and that 
the effect (ceteris paribus) is to transfer labour from velvet manufacture to (building) work on 
the estate. But to Mill this altered pattern of spending increases the demand for labour – an 
extra amount of capital is said to be applied to the support of labour (i.e. the wage-fund is 
increased). 
 
Thus Mill (1866, I, v, 9): 
 
Where there was formerly only one capital employed in maintaining weavers to 
make 1000£ worth of velvet, there is now that same capital employed in making 
something else, and 1000£ distributed among bricklayers besides. There are now 
two capitals employed in remunerating two sets of labourers. 
 
How, we must ask, has Mill managed to conjure up an additional 1000£ worth of capital? His 
explanation is that, if the landowner had (which Mill supposes to be so) given warning that he 
was about to cease buying velvet, the velvet manufacturer could have curtailed production 
accordingly, thereby avoiding a loss on unsold output. The velvet manufacturer “will [then]” 
says Mill, “find himself as rich as before, with undiminished power of employing labour in 
general.
9” Mill’s contention is therefore that there are now two capitals in existence – that of 
the manufacturer plus that of the landowner. Apparently the landowner’s employment of 
labour has added to the wage-fund. This is pure wage-fund theory. 
 
                                                          
8
 “[A] person does good to labourers, not by what he consumes on himself, but solely by what he does not so 
consume.” (Mill, 1866, I, v, 9) 
9
 The “power to employ labour” does not, of course, outside Mill’s world of the wage-fund theory and Say’s 
Law, imply that labour will necessarily be employed. 
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That Mill’s account makes sense only on the basis of his two special assumptions can readily 
be shown. (That is not a problem for Kates, but it is a problem for us.) The fact that the velvet 
manufacturer has been able to withdraw from velvet production without loss, does not mean 
that his existing stock of real capital is unchanged. The demand for capital in velvet 
production has fallen, and (ceteris paribus) nothing has altered elsewhere other than that the 
demand for capital to support extra estate workers (bricklayers) has increased. The 
manufacturer having recovered his financial outlay, cannot simply
10
, as Mill assumes, apply it 
to some other activity – finance may be available, but (apart for the landowner’s 
requirements) there is no new opening for the application of real capital. Only if Say’s Law 
were to apply and exclude any constraint on production from the side of demand, could Mill 
assume that the velvet manufacturer could happily continue activity in some new field of 
operation. Without assuming Say’s Law, along with the wage-fund thesis, there is no reason to 
expect a net increase in real capital or in employment. We conclude that Mill’s attempted 
proof of his contention (that it is of more benefit to labour if the propertied classes contribute 
to charity or themselves directly employ workers rather than spend their incomes on buying 
manufactured products) – while perfectly logical on the basis of his own (and Kates’s) 
assumptions - from a modern perspective, fails. His assumptions are invalid. He does not 
succeed in demonstrating that in conditions of recession extra spending by the well-to-do on 
goods can be of no advantage to the labouring class; it is perfectly possible that additional 
demand for commodities can indeed create demand for labour. 
 
Finally, before we complete our investigation of Mill’s treatment of issues of capital and 
employment, we note what appears to be confusion on his part as to how an increase in 
savings (curtailed spending on luxuries) can add to the wage-fund. This is what Mill says 
(1866, I, v, 3). 
 
The proposition for which I am contending is in reality equivalent to the 
following, which to some minds will appear a truism, though to others it is a 
paradox: that a person does good to labourers not by what he consumes on 
himself, but solely by what he does not so consume.                     (Emphasis added) 
 
That assertion appears to reflect again Mill’s belief in his fourth proposition: his 
understanding, that is to say, that the way to increase employment is not to buy produced 
goods but rather to add to the wage-fund by putting up capital for the direct employment of 
labour. Accordingly, Mill argues that if “I” wish to add to the wage-fund, “I” must cut my 
luxury consumption, and directly “make over” into the hands of workers the purchasing 
power thus saved. In consequence, workers are now enabled to buy subsistence goods with 
the purchasing power “I” have given up. Mill’s point is evidently made in direct opposition to 
Malthus’s contention that it is increased luxury expenditure that is needed to generate 
employment times of recession. Mill puts it thus: 
 
                                                          
10
 “simply”: i.e., with no concern as to the existence of profitable investment opportunities. 
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If instead of laying out 100£ in wine or silk, I expend it in wages, the demand for 
commodities is precisely equal in both cases: in the one, it is a demand for 100£ 
worth of wine or silk, in the other, for the same value of bread, beer, labourers’ 
clothing, fuel and indulgencies; but the labourers of the community have in the 
latter case the value of 100£ more of the produce of the community distributed 
among them. I have consumed that much less and made over my consuming 
power to them. If it were not so, my having consumed less, would not leave more 
to be consumed by others. . . . I have turned over part of my share of the present 
produce of the community to the labourers. 
 
“Turned over”: to ensure that readers grasp his point, Mill adds that the above instance of 
transferring resources to the labouring class can be understood as equivalent to “my” (his) 
handing over (directly transferring) a portion of his income to the “labouring class” - as 
would be done through Poor Law payments: 
 
There cannot be a better reductio ad absurdum of the opposite doctrine than that 
afforded by the Poor Law.  [the “opposite” doctrine being of course  that spending 
by the propertied classes on luxuries for their own consumption can be of benefit 
to labourers.] If it can be equally for the benefit of the labouring classes whether I 
consume my means in the form of things purchased for my own use, or set aside a 
portion in the form of wages or alms for their direct consumption, on what 
grounds can the policy be justified of taking my money away from me to support 
paupers? since my unproductive expenditure would equally have benefitted them, 
while I should have enjoyed it too. If society can both eat its cake and have it, why 
should it not be allowed the double indulgence? 
 
That may seem simple and straightforward, but there is in fact something wrong with Mill’s 
argument. While Mill apparently sees that transfer as putting capital straight into the wage-
fund, on consideration of the situation, we appreciate that such a transfer of purchasing power 
does not, of itself, increase the wage-fund. All it actually does is cause a shift in employment 
from luxury production to wage-good production. (As Mill put it, bread and beer are produced 
- by the same total workforce - and consumed in place of wine and silk.)  
 
Mill seems to have confused charitable giving (a deliberate redistribution of income) with 
saving and investment. The former, by itself, does not increase the wage-fund: part of the 
existing capital employed in supporting labour is re-deployed, from maintaining labour in 
luxury goods production, to maintaining labour as paupers. The total amount of labour 
supported is still the same. What Mill doesn’t appear to have understood is that, if the wage-
fund is to be expanded to permit higher employment, it is not enough simply to redistribute 
purchasing power from the wealthy to the workers: the transfer must result in a sufficiently 
increased production of wage-goods such as can support a larger workforce. For that to 
happen, for the “wage-fund” to be increased and to be applied in supporting labour, there has 
to be an expected increase in the overall demand for labour, that is to say, a justifying 
expectation of an overall increase in demand for the produce of labour.  
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Mill’s adoption of the fourth proposition seems here to have misled him into confusion as to 
how extra resources for the maintenance of labour in employment can be brought into being. 
Simply to persuade the well-to-do to cut back on luxury consumption and hand over a portion 
of the incomes to the labouring classes does not itself create  additional employment. Mill is 
here repeating the error that he made in his example of the landlord reducing purchases of 
luxury manufactures in favour of employing more workers on his estate. We found in that 
instance that Mill was wrong to suppose that the altered pattern of expenditure automatically 
increased the wage-fund. The situation here with the Poor Law parallel is equivalent. 
Switching expenditure from luxury commodities and passing the foregone purchasing power 
directly into the possession of the labouring class does not, per se, increase the wage-fund. 
11
 
 
To repeat: what is essential for the wage-fund to be increased so as to permit extra 
employment to be given is production of sufficient additional capital (wage-goods) by the 
workers transferred from the luxury to the wage-goods sector - additional wage-goods to 
support that extra employment.  How – in a world without Say’s Law - does that happen? 
There, expected demand for output necessarily comes into the picture. More wage-goods will 
be produced only if it is anticipated that the demand for labour (to take up these extra wage-
goods) is about to increase in expectation of a growing demand for output. So much for the 
fourth proposition. 
  
Conclusions 
 
We conclude that while, in terms of his own assumptions – assumptions characteristic of the 
old classical focus on supply as the essential driving force within the economy - Mill’s fourth 
proposition is – as demonstrated by Kates - a straightforward logical conclusion (with no 
element of paradox). But although Kates succeeds in guiding us to an understanding of what 
Mill meant by his fourth proposition, he fails to persuade us that we should accept that 
contentious proposition. It acceptability depends on the acceptability in its turn of Mill’s basic 
assumption that “demand is constituted by supply”, together with the associated wage-fund 
theory.  From a modern perspective, which recognises that it is expectations of demand which 
determine production and employment, Mill’s assumptions are untenable. If Kates wishes to 
persuade us of the validity and relevance of Mill’s proposition, he would have to persuade us 
also to accept the obsolete doctrines which underpin it.  
 
We allow that Kates’s paper makes a valuable contribution in clarifying what Mill was getting 
at with his fourth fundamental proposition on capital, but that is all. Ironically however, 
Kates’s double-edged elucidation, far from rehabilitating Mill’s proposition, inadvertently 
                                                          
11
 Note that when funds are transferred to paupers via the Poor Law, that must be the end of the story; these 
monies are spent on maintenance of the recipients – and do not make it possible to put additional workers into 
employment. No increase in the wage-fund can be generated. But if, as in Mill’s prior instance, the funds 
released by the wealthy are paid to labour made redundant from the luxury goods sector, and if all of these 
workers are put to producing an extra supply of wage-goods, the wage-fund could thereby be increased: but that 
would happen automatically only if Say’s Law held good. 
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makes it clear that this notorious thesis has no place in modern macroeconomic theory. While 
it is true that certain things of great value in the old classical tradition of economic thought - 
for instance the concept of production with a surplus, recognition of the importance of 
economic power in determining distribution – were lost with later (neoclassical) 
developments, Mill’s fourth proposition is not one of these; it is no hidden gem. It is time for 
Kates to accept that a curtain ought to be drawn over this obsolete proposition. 
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